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CASE COMMENTS
But even this "cooling off" period does not resolve the problem of
what constitutes reconciliation.
Thus, it is suggested that the best solution is to enter a final decree
in the first instance, and do away with reconciliation periods. By doing
this, the parties are not deprived of an opportunity to reconcile be-
cause there is nothing to prevent them from remarrying each other.
PAUL H. BoswELL
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE RULE OF EXCLUSION
IN TORT ACTIONS
Mention of the word "insurance" in the court room brings about
an amazing sequence of events: the judge straightens in his chair,
counsel for -the plaintiff is speechless upon the realization that he
"unwittingly" spoke the forbidden word, defendant's counsel is on his
feet objecting and moving for a mistrial, the confused jury is hastily
escorted to the jury room, and the trial is most likely at an end.
An almost universal rule of exclusion has evolved in our courts,
subject to certain exceptions and qualifications,1 which prohibits the
direct or indirect mention of the fact of liability insurance in the
trial of personal injury or wrongful death actions.2 The reasoning of
the courts is based upon the proposition that evidence of liability
notice, depending upon the individual state. This waiting period between the filing
of the complaint, and the hearing upon the merits is known as a "cooling off
period" during which the parties can reconcile if they so desire. See Conn. Gen.
Stat. Rev. § 46-16 (1958) (go day waiting period); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, §§ 23-29
(Smith-Hurd 1949) (6o day waiting period); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 6o-1517 (1949)
(6o day waiting period); Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.9 (1956); S.C. Code Ann. §
20-108 (1962) (2 mos. waiting period); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Art. 4632 (1948) (3o day
waiting period); Vt. Stat. tit. 14 ch. 157 (1947) (6 mos. waiting period if children
are involved).
'The "Rule of Exclusion" will not operate to exclude: (1) a showing of interest
or of bias of a witness, (2) an admission of liability including a reference to in-
surance coverage, (3) voir dire disqualification of prospective jurors or, (4) evi-
dence of a material nature. See generally, 21 Appleman, Insurance Law and Prac-
tive §§ 12834-12836 (1962); annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949).
3References to insurance have been held not to constitute error where the
insurance carrier is named party of record, or where insurance coverage is com-
pulsory. Yellow Cab Co. v. Bradin, 172 Md. 388, 191 Atl. 717 (1937); Shadwick v.
Hills, 79 Ohio App. 143, 69 N.E.2d 197 (1946); Reeves v. Tittle, 129 S.W.2d 364
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
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insurance is irrelevant to the material issues in the case and is likely
to have a prejudicial effect upon the verdict.3
Although the fact of liability insurance is frequently brought to the
attention of the jury by the direct introduction of evidence,4 this com-
ment is devoted to a consideration of instances in which counsel indi-
rectly, either by design or otherwise, suggests to the jury that the de-
fendant is insured.
The question recently confronted the Supreme Court of South
Carolina in the case of Crocker v. Weathers5 which was an action for
damages for the wrongful death of plaintiff's intestate. The facts of
the case disclose that decedent was a passenger in an automobile
owned and operated by the defendant, and that his death was the
result of injuries received from an accident involving the automobile
in which he was riding. At the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief,
defendant moved for a nonsuit on the ground that plaintiff's intestate
was driving the automobile at the time of the accident, and that he
was guilty of contributory negligence. The trial judge overruled the
motion and defendant rested without offering any testimony.
During his argument to the jury, plaintiff's counsel stated: "If
you will write a verdict for the amount we ask for in this complaint,
I will collect at least $2oooo.oo."6 Immediately after this statement
was made, defendant's counsel objected and moved for a mistrial on
the ground that the argument was highly improper and prejudicial in
that the only inference which could be drawn was that the defendant
carried liability insurance. The motion was overruled, and the de-
fendant excepted. After the rendition of a verdict for actual and puni-
tive damages, the defendant moved for judgment non obstante veredic-
to or for a new trial in the alternative. Appeal was taken upon an ad-
verse ruling on the motion.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the trial judge
properly refused to grant defendant's motions and affirmed the judg-
ment. In regard to the argument by plaintiff's counsel, however, the
court reaffirmed its adherence to the long established rule that the fact
3Strahan v. Webb, 231 Ark. 426, 330 S.W.2d 291 (1959); Struetker v. Neiser, 29 o
S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1956); Butera v. Donner, 177 Misc. 966, 32 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup.
Ct. 1942); Smith v. Pacific Truck Express, 164 Ore. 318, lO P.2d 474 (194o); Wood-
ward v. Wilbur, 54 R.I. 60, 169 Atl. 486 (1933); Ronan v. J. G. Turnball Co., 99 Vt.
280, 131 Ad. 788 (1926).
'The question of insurance most commonly presents itself by the introduc-
tion of documents and testimony of witnesses. See generally, Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 76
(1949).
5240 S.C. 412, 126 S.E.2d 335 (1962).
6126 S.E.2d at 34 o .
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of liability insurance should not be made known to the jury, and that
where the fact of insurance is clearly implied by argument of counsel,
the court would not hesitate to reverse a judgment for the plaintiff.7
The court went on to point out that the argument of counsel is largely
within the control and discretion of the trial judge and that his rulings
will be upheld unless there has been an abuse of discretion. In find-
ing no abuse of discretion, the court affirmed the judgment, noting
however, that the point was a close one.
At one time, the Nebraska courts followed a judicial doctrine al-
lowing the introduction of evidence indicating that the defendant in
a tort action was covered by liability insurance. The rule was an-
nounced in the case of Jessup v. Davis.8 The court reasoned that the
insurance carrier was the real party in interest, and that a rule of ex-
clusion put the court in the position of being a party to a kind of
"benevolent judicial concealment," incompatible with an open court
and judgments which are arrived at openly and publicly. The Davis
case was subsequently overruled by Fielding v. Publix Cars, Inc.9
There, the court held such evidence to be inadmissible on the ground
that it was irrelevant and likely to have a prejudicial effect upon the
verdict.
Where counsel expressly mentions insurance in the opening state-
ment or in the closing argument, such conduct has been universally
condemned, 10 and where such statements have obviously prevented
a fair and impartial verdict, courts will not hesitate to hold that they
constitute reversible error.31
The issue of insurance is most frequently brought into a case
through indirect references by counsel in argument to the jury.' 2 Such
statements as "You people know exactly who will pay that verdict' 13
or 'We have sued here merely for $5.ooo.oo for reasons which we can-
not explain.. .",4 may very well result in reversal of a judgment for
'The rule is set forth in Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S.C. 236, 75 S.E.
533 (1912).
8115 Neb. 1, 211 N.W. 190 (1926).
s3o Neb. 576, 265 N.W. 726 (1936).
"0Edwards v. Earnest, 2o6 Ala. 1, 89 So. 729 (1921); Ryan v. Noble, 95 Fla.
830, ni6 So. 766 (1928); Floyd v. Hibbard, 227 Iowa 149, 287 N.W. 829 (1939); Chil-
cutt v. Keating, 220 Miss. 545, 71 So. 2d 472 (1954); Harris v. Elliott, 178 Okla. 98,
61 P.2d 1o89 (1936).
"Norris v. West, 78 Ind. App. 391, 129 N.E. 862 (1921); Trevillian v. Boswell,
241 Ky. 237, 43 S.W.2d 715 (1931); Leonard v. Stepp, 175 Okla. 487, 53 P.2d 111o
(1936); Hollis v. United States Glass Co., 220 Pa. 49, 69 At. 55 (1908).
"Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 788 (1949).
"McCornack v. Pickerell, 225 Iowa 1076, 28, N.W. 899, 903 (1939).
2Ingerick v. Mess, 63 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1933).
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the plaintiff. Where, however, it is not sufficiently clear that the jury
has been improperly influenced by such remarks, and the evidence
supports the verdict, many courts will affirm the judgment if it ap-
pears that the error was cured by the trial judge's admonishment to
the jury to disregard the improper statement.15
Although earlier cases took the view that the error in the mention
of insurance could not be cured by striking the improper statement
and instructing the jury to disregard it,16 the recent trend of cases ap-
pears to accept a general rule that such improper statements can be
cured at the trial level. 17 However, while admitting that recent de-
cisions tend to wink at and ignore such transgressions, the Missouri
Court of Appeals in Hildreth v. Key' s recently said:
"[T]he condemned practice of injecting liability insurance
coverage into jury trials is just as pernicious and reprehensible
today as it was fifty years ago. .. [and where] counsel have
chosen deliberately to pollute and poison the stream of justice,
imposition of the drastic, but only effectual, remedy of setting
aside the verdict should be imposed.'9
It should be noted that even in jurisdictions which adhere strictly
to the rule of exclusion, there are certain instances where it will be
held proper for counsel to refer to the fact of liability insurance. 20
For example, counsel's argument concerning a witness's connection
with an insurance company has been held proper where it is justified
by the evidence as indicating bias or interest.2' It has also been held
proper for counsel to argue the fact of insurance where the subject
has been properly admitted during presentation of the evidence.
22
5Stafford v. Noble, io5 Kan. 219, 182 Pac. 650 (1919); O'Brien v. Bernoi, 297
Mass. 271, 8 N.E.2d 780 (1937); Gerbing v. McDonald, 201 Wis. 214, 229 N.W. 86o
(1930).
"'Annot, 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 821 (1949).
",Clark v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 63o, 93 So. 2d 138 (1956); Ades v. Brush, 66 Cal.
App. 2d 436, 152 P.2d 519 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944); Gwynn Oak Park, Inc. v. Becker,
177 Md. 528, 1o A.2d 625 (194o); Barger v. Green, 255 S.W.2d 127 (Kansas City, Mo.
Ct. App. 1953); Pedek v. Wegemann, 275 Wis. 57, 81 N.W.2d 49 (1957). Contra, Roth-
enberg v. Collins, 161 App. Div. 387, 146 N.Y.S. 762 (1914); Wilkins v. Schwartz, iol
W.Va. 337, 132 S.E. 887 (1926).
19341 S.W.2d 6ox (Springfield, Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
'OId. at 615-16.
'See 21 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 12840 (1962).
ncGrawford v. Rose, 2 Cal. App. 2d 734, 39 P.2d 217 (Dist. Ct. App. 1934);
Hedger v. Davis, 236 Ky. 432, 33 S.W.2d 31o (193o); Hornby v. Wiper, 155 Ore. 203,
63 P.2d 2o4 (1936).
'Where the evidence introduced is competent upon some material issue, see
International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 127 At. 647 (1925); Joyce v. Biring, 226
Mo. App. 162, 43 S.W.2d 845 (St. Louis 1931); Lisanti v. William F. Kenny Co.,
225 App. Div. 129, 232 N.Y. Supp. 103 (1928).
CASE COMMENTS
Furthermore, even where it is improper for plaintiff's counsel to argue
the fact of insurance, such argument will usually be permitted if it is
invited by the improper argument of defendant's counsel. 2
3
It is submitted that, in reaffirming its adherence to the long es-
tablished rule of exclusion, the South Carolina court added precedent
to a judicial doctrine that has become outmoded.
The rule against disclosure of liability insurance arose in an era
when such coverage was uncommon and when the possibility of in-
surance would never occur to a jury without its being brought to its
attention. Today, liability insurance is almost a necessity of life, and
its existence is assumed. It is inconceivable that the average jury
would be unaware of the probability that the defendant is covered
by liability insurance.
It is generally thought that there are only two persons before the
court in a tort action, and that the trial should be conducted without
reference to the question of whether or not the defendant is insured.
24
Nevertheless, the fact is that insurance companies are real parties to
actions against their insured; they control the investigation, litigation
and settlement of each case.
In attempting to conceal from the jury something that they already
assume, our courts put a tremendous strain on the trial of tort actions.
Counsel are never quite sure of the stand they should take, and even
the most careful preparation and conduct of the trial cannot always
guard against inadvertent references to insurance.25 In Indian Ref. Co.
v. Crain,26 plaintiff's counsel said "this insurance company" in his
closing argument, when he meant to say "this Indian Company."
There, the Kentucky Court of Appeals flatly condemned the injection
of the question of insurance, regardless of intention, and reversed a
judgment for the plaintiff. Similarly, the New York Supreme Court in
Tacktill v. Eastern Capitol Lines, Inc.2 7 held that an inadvertent ref-
erence to insurance by counsel in his summation constituted reversible
error, even where the trial court attempted to cure the error in its
instruction to the jury. Moreover, concealing the fact of insurance only
Vineyard v. Storm, 185 Ark. 1148, 51 S.W.2d 86o (1932); Houston v. Taylor,
5o Ga. App. 811, 179 S.E. 207 (1935); Hinman v. Gould, 205 Minn. 377, 286 N.W.
364 (1939); McKay v. Pacific Bldg. Materials Co., 156 Ore. 578, 68 P.2d 127 (1937);
Majestic Steam Laundry v. Puckett, 161 Va. 524, 171 S.E. 491 (1933).
-'Pennix v. Winton, 61 Cal. App. 2d 761, 143 P.2d 94o (Dist. Ct. App. 1943).
-See Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 Kan. L. Rev. 675, 710 (1957).
2 28o Ky. 112, 132 S.W.2d 750 (1939).
-'26o App. Div. 58, 21 N.Y.S.2d 14, 16 (1940)- Plaintiff's counsel, in his summa-
tion, said: "[TJhis insurance company-I mean bus company...."
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